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Abstract 
 
This dissertation studies the impact of capital account openness on the level of 
consumption and investment international risk-sharing. It does so by analyzing a panel 
consisting of 100 advanced and developing economies for the annual periods between 
1995 and 2016. The econometric results indicate that economies with completely open 
capital accounts have approximately between 20% and 50% less dependence on 
domestic income growth to finance their consumption growth whilst their investment 
growth is up to one half less sensitive on domestic output growth. The findings for the 
degree of consumption risk-sharing at the mean level of capital controls are roughly 
comparable with those previously found in the literature, but the novelty of this exercise 
is to document the sensitivity of consumption risk-sharing to measures of capital 
controls across distinct country groups and using a more up-to-date sample. The 
approach for measuring investment risk-sharing is an addition to what has been done 
in usual studies of international risk-sharing assessments. To the extent that excessive 
sensitivity of consumption and investment to domestic income shocks detract from 
societal welfare, the empirical findings of this thesis highlight some of the overall 
benefits of capital account openness. 
 
Keywords: international risk-sharing, long-run efficiency, capital mobility, capital 
account liberalization. 
JEL codes: E02, F02, F21, F38.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent decades have witnessed a heated discussion on the potential benefits of capital 
account liberalization and its symmetrical criticisms, which highlight the eventual need 
for capital controls enforcement. While some arguments in favor of liberalization typically 
focus on the potential wider availability of resources for investment through capital 
inflows, or the possibility for individuals and firms to diversify risk through consumption 
and income smoothing, many macro-financial crises in both advanced and developing 
countries – including the European debt crises of 2009-2012 lend support to the 
suspicion that fully open capital accounts also come at the cost of greater 
macroeconomic and financial vulnerability. 
The Great Recession of 2008-2009 has spurred renewed interest on the possible 
benefits of capital controls, with several countries across the entire spectrum of 
development considering its introduction, and some actually implementing them. Among 
developing countries, for instance, Brazil responded to the crisis by implementing 
controls on inflows in order to fight currency appreciation (Garcia & Chamon, 2013). 
Among developed countries, Iceland opted for introducing controls facing capital 
outflows when facing currency depreciation pressures in the wake of a banking crisis 
(Fernandéz, Klein, Rebucci, Schindler & Uribe, 2016) and so did Greece in 2015 in an 
effort to restrict capital outflows and build reserves to honor external debt commitments. 
Studies on the various implications of capital account openness extend from its direct 
impact – on the cost of capital, market discipline and national savings – all the way to 
more indirect and proven hard to show impacts on output growth or income inequality. 
While the former examples of potential benefits have been the topic of some interesting 
literature (e.g. Chari & Henry (2004) and Harrison, Love & McMillan (2004) on the cost 
of capital; Garrett and Mitchel (2000) on market discipline improvements of public 
spending), the latter, especially in regard to liberalization’s impact on economic growth 
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suffer from inconsistent evidence, with the most prominent literature on this field reaching 
either mixed results (Edwards, 2001) or no conclusion whatsoever (Rodrik, 1998).     
This thesis focuses on a subset of all these possible effects, namely, on the effects of 
capital account openness on international risk-sharing through the channels of 
consumption and investment. Similarly to Kose, Prasad and Torrones (2009), we would 
expect greater levels of capital mobility to come as a major benefit for agents wishing to 
smooth consumption growth, insuring against country-wide shocks through international 
pooling of such risk and, in turn, enhancing efficiency. As Fernandéz et. al (2016) point 
out the same should apply to investment, as openness to financial flows, which allows 
agents to borrow and lend abroad, should also promote efficiency and spur growth 
altogether by allowing domestic investment to differ from domestic savings. 
 We intend to assess this by extending Kose, Prasad and Torrones’s (2009) approach 
regarding consumption risk-sharing to investment flows, supporting this analysis on 
Fernandéz et. al (2016) new dataset of capital controls, which builds on previous 
measures and adds financial asset categories for a large sample of 100 countries and a 
timeframe of 22 periods. This dataset includes 31 Advanced Economies and 69 
Emerging Markets & Developing Economies, and classifies them through Klein’s (2012) 
labels of either Open, Gate or Wall, depending on the level of capital controls each 
country has in place each year, with Open economies being those with virtually no 
restrictions on capital flows, Wall economies with substantial controls on most or even 
all asset categories, and Gate economies being those which have only sporadically put 
in place significant controls.   
This work shall be divided into four sections: the first of which focusing on a review of 
the most important literature developments on this topic; the second section extends and 
clarifies the aspects related to the methodology which is to be employed, along with the 
data we use for this analysis; in the third section we analyze the results which were 
reached with the methodology described in the second section, with this analysis then 
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dividing into two sub-parts: one regarding the baseline model and the second addressing 
due robustness tests. Finally, for the fourth section, we conclude by summarizing our 
findings and provide recommendations for future research. 
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2. International risk-sharing 
 
2.1. On the concept of long-run efficiency 
 
The theoretical underpinnings for understanding the concept of long-run efficiency are 
taken from Heathcote and Perri (2014). The authors note the importance of preferences, 
technologies and frictions specification for establishing a sound definition of efficiency 
which serves as a baseline scenario which one may compare with actual observed 
allocations in order to assess the level of observed (in)efficiency. When a typical 
literature set-up is used, one assumes a representative agent economy (where there are 
similar utility functions to depict consumer preferences). Building on this, Heathcote and 
Perri (2014) consider two alternative ways through which information on the 
consumption, investment and output growth rate (which should equate the productivity 
growth rate) are disclosed: one in which agents are perfectly informed about future 
productivity (named “perfect foresight”), and another in which agents assume 
productivity grows at the same rate as world (aggregate) productivity (i.e. they do not 
take into consideration eventual economy-idiosyncratic shocks), being informed at the 
end of each period about the actual realized productivity growth on the previous period 
(this hypothesis is named “repeated surprises”). Of course, frictions may exist, and to 
deal with that, traditionally three possible states of the world are introduced: financial 
autarky (no asset trade between countries), bond economy (where agents can borrow 
and lend from the world economy by trading an international one period bond), and 
complete markets (where people trade a full set of state-contingent claims at each date). 
For each of these three scenarios, there’s a different efficient allocation. When 
concerning international risk-sharing, the usual baseline term of comparison is a 
complete market economy, or, in other words, the absence of financial frictions. 
Assuming common preferences across countries, baseline efficient allocations may be 
determined. 
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Under complete markets and considering small countries relative to the world economy 
(Heathcote and Perri, 2014), both consumption and investment should grow at the each 
respective world (aggregate) growth rates, since all countries invest to equate their own 
marginal product of capital to the world interest rate, and financial trade allows the 
marginal utility of consumption growth rate to equate that of the world economy. 
Concerning investment long-run efficient allocations specifically, Lucas (1990) explains, 
through the example of two economies which face the same technology conditions 
(constant returns to scale) and freely trade a single good, that the Law of Diminishing 
Returns suggests that any initial difference in production between economies (given by 
differences in the level of capital per worker) should disappear because for the poorer 
country would face a higher marginal product of capital and, henceforth, attract capital 
flows coming from the richer country.  
 
2.2. On the concept of international risk-sharing 
Traditional theory on capital account liberalization suggests that, after the removal of 
capital controls, there should be a significant increase in international capital 
transactions, increasing the levels of risk-sharing associated with each country’s 
idiosyncratic consumption (Kose, Prasad and Torrones, 2009). As Mace (1991) asserts, 
the chief implication of risk-sharing is that individual consumption varies not based on 
idiosyncratic factors such as individual income, but is rather influenced (positively) by 
aggregate consumption. 
Theoretical welfare gains from international risk-sharing have been widely presented and 
celebrated in literature, based on the premise that allowing for consumption smoothing 
between nations may help reduce a country’s dependence of its national income 
variations, insuring against eventual slumps in output growth or temporary increases in 
domestic investment (Brennan and Solnik, 1989). A similar logic has been presented 
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regarding the gains retrieved from international risk-sharing for investment flows – should 
complete markets be in place, countries expecting to grow faster would benefit from 
using international financial markets to fund higher investment rates (Heathcote and 
Perri, 2014). Skepticism on these results has been fed by some evidence that gains from 
international risk-sharing, despite real, may be small (Cole and Obstfeld, 1991) and too 
easily offset by increased volatility which enlarges country-specific risk (Tobin, 1978). 
The argument in favor of international consumption risk-sharing follows from the 
Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH), the theory which suggests an absence of 
correlation between the transitory component of income and consumption, so that 
consumers decide to smooth their consumption based on their expectations for their 
“permanent income”, or the invariant component of an individual’s income. As stated by 
Mace (1991), risk sharing would imply that individual consumption responded only to 
aggregate risk, and not to individual-specific risk, making it an “extreme version” of the 
PIH.  
 
2.3. Review of the empirical literature 
 
Empirical studies on the matter of international risk-sharing have been incomparably 
more abundant for consumption than for investment risk-sharing. Thus, for a brief review, 
the scarce investment-related literature is presented first, followed by a more complete 
overview of the works on consumption risk-sharing. 
An important contribution to the understanding of international allocation of capital was 
obtained from Caselli and Fryer (2007), where the authors calculate the marginal product 
of capital for a wide panel of developed and developing countries between the period 
1960-2003 and conclude that there must be an efficient allocation of capital, given the 
negligible differences in the marginal product of capital across countries. 
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On a particularly circumscribed approach to the evolution of private investment for the 
post-2008 crisis, the IMF (2015) looks for different explanatory factors, one of which 
being the potential influence of financial constraints and policy uncertainty. Considering 
a sample of over 27 thousand firms from 32 advanced economies, they find that the 
reduced credit availability played a role in the private investment slump, with most credit-
dependent firms being the most affected. We would hope to extend this analysis and find 
that the existence of capital controls, as a direct constraint on credit availability, produces 
a similarly significant negative effect on national investment growth. 
Heathcote and Perri (2014) take on data comprised of 112 countries for the period of 
1960 to 2010, during which there’s an evolution from what financial autarky was a 
reasonable approximation, in the first half of this period, towards a world economy with 
increasing openness, during its second half. Allocations are seen as not efficient for any 
of the two halves of the period regardless of the openness setting: results suggest that, 
while faster-growing economies were expected to use international financial markets to 
increase their own consumption and investment based on future expected higher 
income, they were exporting savings and accumulating positive net foreign asset 
positions over time. For their assessment on the impact of capital account openness on 
risk-sharing, they find that countries which were more open seemed to enjoy less risk-
sharing.  
In a seminal paper focusing on the first strand of risk-sharing – Cole and Obstfeld (1991) 
– attempts to shed light on the welfare gains derived from international capital mobility 
by analyzing different allocations of consumption across countries, accounting for 
different states of the world, taking as given the distribution of output and ends up 
concluding there’s but a small loss from prohibiting international diversification. Brennan 
and Solnik (1989) follow a similar approach and compare real per capita consumption 
allocation across countries with that which would have prevailed if capital mobility had 
been prohibited, confirming the hypothesis that international financial flows may serve to 
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smooth national consumption. Both studies attempt to quantify the welfare loss (gain) 
which would arise from fully restricting (enhancing) capital mobility and, while the former 
state that this welfare loss wouldn’t be expected to exceed 0.15 percent of average 
national output per year, the latter determine a loss of 4-8 percent loss in the level of 
consumption of the period they consider. Cole and Obstfeld (1991) depict as a fragility 
of their study the fact that they did not extend their approach to international investment 
flows, while Brennan and Solnik (1989) recognize that their assumption of invariant 
domestic investment regarding the capital flow regime was “clearly a simplifying one”, 
noting the importance of the existence of international capital flows for investors to direct 
their wealth towards less risky production processes. As a direct reply, Obstfeld (1992) 
criticizes Brennan and Solnik’s (1989) work warning that the results the authors reach 
are faulty, especially in the measure employed of welfare loss. According to Obstfeld 
(1992), regarding this measurement, it mustn’t make much sense to assume that the full 
burden of capital account restrictions would fall on consumption alone, leaving 
investment constant. In this review, the author warns it would have been better to 
compute compensating or equivalent variations to compute the welfare loss from 
prohibiting financial trade, concluding, through the same methodology settings as 
Brennan and Solnik (1989) that total loss would amount, instead, to no more than 0,2% 
of output, accusing the former of overestimation of the welfare loss from enforcing capital 
restrictions. 
More recent work such as that developed by Kose, Prasad and Torrones (2009), builds 
on this equation to assess risk-sharing. In their work, they perform cross-section, time 
series and panel regressions on a sample which features 69 countries facing different 
stages of development (21 of which are advanced economies, while the remaining 48 
developing economies are subdivided into 21 emerging market economies and 27 other 
developing economies), over the time period spanning from 1960 to 2004. Their findings 
are coherent across all estimation methods employed and suggest that risk-sharing of 
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idiosyncratic consumption risk is higher for advanced economies than for developing 
ones. They find that advanced economies share between 30% and 50% of their 
consumption risk internationally, while developing economies share only 10% to 30% of 
that same risk. Once they try to assess the impact that financial integration and 
liberalization pose on risk-sharing, they find limited evidence that it has helped to 
increase consumption risk-sharing for advanced economies and no evidence suggesting 
it had done so for developing economies.  
Gardberg (2019) follows an identical baseline approach to Kose, Prasad and Torrones 
(2009), regressing the same equation for an unbalanced panel of 120 countries (30 of 
which advanced economies and the remaining 90 developing economies) over the 
period 1970-2014. In order to reconsider the conclusion obtained by Kose, Prasad and 
Torrones (2009) regarding the (modest to null) impact of capital account liberalization on 
consumption risk-sharing, Gardberg (2019) adds several measures of financial 
liberalization and integration, such as an index of financial reform, the Chinn & Ito (2006) 
index for financial liberalization, and the total foreign liabilities to GDP ratio as a measure 
of de facto financial integration measure. For the baseline model, he reaches degrees of 
risk-sharing compatible with those found on previous works (around 33% for the full 
sample, and between 25% and 71% when subdividing for different income groups of 
countries, with varying results depending on the estimation method employed). However, 
Gardberg’s (2019) results contrast with Kose, Prasad and Torrones (2009) as he finds 
the significant impact of the financial sector policies extend to less developed countries, 
while it had been previously suggested that these liberalization policies should only reach 
a significant effect on risk-sharing once countries reached a certain level of institutional 
development (Kose, Prasad and Torrones, 2009). 
The apparent lack of international risk-sharing has motivated some interesting 
contributions as well. Lewis (1996) addresses this issue by testing for two possible 
explanations: the existence of non-separable utility of tradeables with leisure, non-traded 
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goods and durable goods; the existence of capital market restrictions which limit or 
prohibit the ownership of foreign assets. In order to test the first possible explanation, 
the author uses two panel data sets, one with aggregate and the other with disaggregate 
consumption into groups of tradeable and non-tradeable, durable and non-durable 
goods, the first of which for 72 countries between 1950 and 1992, and the second one 
covering 48 countries measured in 5-year intervals between 1970 and 1985. To test the 
second hypothesis, Lewis (1996) asks whether countries with capital restrictions 
displayed a greater covariation between consumption growth and domestic output. While 
neither of the hypothesis explained the lack of international risk-sharing by itself, when 
the two were jointly considered – the existence of non-separable preferences as well as 
capital market restrictions – the hypothesis of risk-sharing was not rejected. Finally, 
Kraay (1998) has also weighed in on this issue: by first reasserting empirically how small 
or unidentifiable the gains from financial openness are to macroeconomic outcomes such 
as output, investment growth or lower inflation, the author sets off to evaluate whether 
two of the most common hypothetical explanations for this result may hold. The first of 
these hypotheses is that uncertainty brought about by increased volatility in capital flows 
might offset benefits from capital account liberalization, and the second one is that capital 
account liberalization requires a supportive policy and institutional framework in order to 
provide macroeconomic benefits. The author found little evidence to support either one 
of these hypotheses, allowing to redirect the discussion to issues directly related to 
capital account openness itself – namely, whether current measures of openness are 
sufficiently accurate and whether capital account liberalization simply does not provide 
significant macroeconomic benefits. 
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3. Methodology and data 
 
3.1. Data 
The analysis introduced above is applied to the whole sample of Fernandéz, et. al (2016). 
This consists of a total of 100 countries, 31 of which are classified according to the IMF 
World Economic Outlook (2016) as Advanced Economies and 69 of which are 
considered Emerging Markets & Developing Economies.  
Figure 1: Level of capital controls in country averages (1995-2016) 
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The sample covers the groups displayed in Table 3.1 for 21 periods, from 1995 to 2016. 
All data for consumption, investment, output, population and the relative price of 
investment is taken from Penn World Tables 9.1 under the national accounts-based 
variables. Real consumption and output are directly taken as the variables in constant 
national 2011 prices, while real investment is deduced from the difference between real 
domestic absorption (defined in Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2015) as the sum of 
domestic consumption and domestic investment) and real consumption. All three are 
turned into per capita variables and the annual values for the relative price of investment 
variable is calculated according to IMF (2019) and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) 
from the same Penn World Tables dataset. 
The data for the measures of capital controls is taken from Fernandéz, et. al (2016), yet 
to serve as comparison and robustness checks a complementary measure is also 
introduced: the well-known Chinn & Ito (2006) measure of capital openness, which 
measures a country’s level of capital account openness on a scale from 0 to 1, where 1 
depicts an economy with a completely open capital account, i.e. it is symmetric to the 
measure from Fernandéz, et. al (2016). To deal with this and allow for easier comparison, 
we transform the Chinn & Ito index to become a measure of capital controls, where a 
value of 1 depicts an economy with high capital controls. In order to simplify, when these 
indices are mentioned, the Fernandéz, et. al (2016) shall be named as Schindler index, 
and the Chinn & Ito (2006) index will be named Chinn & Ito index. An overview of the 
level of capital controls in country averages as measured by both indices can be found 
in Figure 1, labelled as either Open, Gate or Wall economies, under the Klein (2012) 
nomenclature mentioned in the Introduction section . 
The main difference between these two indices is that Chinn & Ito takes into account 
current account transactions, while Schindler doesn’t. Regarding the dataset coverage, 
the Chinn & Ito index covers the whole sample of countries for the chosen time period, 
with the exception of Brunei (for the entire dataset period), Czech Republic, Georgia, 
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Kazakhstan, Latvia, Moldova, Russia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Ukraine and Uzbekistan 
(on 1995), Kirgizstan (on 1995 and 1996), and Yemen (on 2011). 
 
Table 3.1 – Country classifications according to World Economic Outlook 2016 
 
 
  
Advanced Economies (31) Emerging Markets (50) Developing Economies (19) 
Australia Gate Algeria Wall Panama Open Bangladesh Gate 
Austria Open Angola Wall Paraguay Open Bolivia Gate 
Belgium Open Argentina Gate Peru Open Burkina Faso Gate 
Canada Open Bahrain Gate Philippines Wall Côte D’Ivoire Wall 
Cyprus Gate Brazil Gate Poland Gate Ethiopia Gate 
Czech Republic Gate Brunei Open Qatar Open Ghana Gate 
Denmark Open Bulgaria Gate Romania Gate Kenya Gate 
Finland Open Chile Gate Russia Gate Kirgizstan Gate 
France Open China Wall Saudi Arabia Gate Moldova Gate 
Germany Gate Colombia Gate South Africa Gate Myanmar Gate 
Greece Open Costa Rica Open Sri Lanka Wall Nicaragua Open 
Hong Kong Open Dominican Republic Gate Swaziland Wall Nigeria Gate 
Iceland Gate Ecuador Gate Thailand Gate Tanzania Wall 
Ireland Open Egypt Open Tunisia Wall Togo Wall 
Israel Gate El Salvador Open Turkey Gate Uganda Gate 
Italy Open Georgia Open Ukraine Wall Uzbekistan Wall 
Japan Open Guatemala Open United Arab Emirates Gate Vietnam Gate 
Korea Gate Hungary Gate Uruguay Open Yemen Open 
Latvia Open India Wall Venezuela Gate Zambia Open 
Malta Gate Indonesia Gate     
Netherlands Open Iran Gate     
New Zealand Open Jamaica Gate     
Norway Open Kazakhstan Gate     
Portugal Gate Kuwait Gate     
Singapore Open Lebanon Gate     
Slovenia Gate Malaysia Wall     
Spain Open Mauritius Open     
Sweden Open Mexico Gate     
Switzerland Gate Morocco Wall     
United Kingdom Open Oman Open     
United States Open Pakistan Wall     
Open (36) / Gate (48) / Wall (16) 
20 / 11 / 0  13 / 25 / 12 3 / 12 / 4 
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3.2. Baseline Models 
 
Important developments in risk-sharing assessment were obtained through Obstfeld 
(1994) and Lewis (1996). Both observe that, should international risk-sharing be 
complete, then consumption growth in a given country should be uncorrelated with the 
country-specific shocks it faces. Lewis (1996) suggested the use of the difference 
between lagged national output and lagged world (aggregate) output as a measure for 
these country-specific shocks, which should hold a coefficient of zero should there be 
perfect risk-sharing. Obstfeld (1994) suggested first-differencing national and world 
consumption levels, due to concerns about stochastic trends. Taking both contributions 
together would result in the currently widely employed (see Kose, Prasad and Torrones, 
2009; Baxter, 2012; Gardberg, 2019) regression form of the difference between national 
and world (aggregate) consumption growth rates on the difference between national and 
world (aggregate) output growth rates: 
∆ ln 𝐶𝑖𝑡 − ∆ ln 𝐶𝑡
∗ =  𝛽𝑖 +  𝛽𝑡(∆ ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡 − ∆ ln 𝑌𝑡
∗) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (1) 
In the above equation where i denotes the ith country and t denotes the tth year, ∆ ln 𝑐𝑖𝑡 
is the change in (log) real per capita domestic consumption, and ∆ ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡 the change in 
(log) real per capita domestic output; ∆ ln 𝐶𝑡
∗ is the change in (log) real per capita world 
consumption, and ∆ ln 𝑌𝑡
∗ the change in (log) real per capita world output; 𝜃 is a linear 
time trend variable. The fixed effect 𝛽𝑖 allows domestic consumption growth to diverge 
from world consumption growth. The residual term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 captures non-systematic 
influences on consumption risk sharing, some of which could in principle be correlated 
across time. 
Once we take equation (1) and add an interaction term to assess how the level of capital 
controls influences the level of international risk-sharing, we get 
∆ ln 𝐶𝑖𝑡 − ∆ ln 𝐶𝑡
∗ =  𝛽𝑖 +  𝛽𝑡(∆ ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡 − ∆ ln 𝑌𝑡
∗) + 𝛿𝑡𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∗ (∆ ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡 − ∆ ln 𝑌𝑡
∗) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (2) 
  
15 
 
where 𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛 is the chosen index of capital controls, which varies from 0 (in the absence 
of capital controls) to 1 (when the capital account is fully closed). Following the standard 
consumption risk-sharing literature, the level of IRS is obtained through 1–𝛽𝑡 from (1). 
By adding an interaction variable as in (2), the same procedure (1–𝛽𝑡) provides the value 
for the level of IRS of fully open economies (for which 𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛 has a value of 0). 
Following this same logic, but lacking a similarly accessible interpretation of 𝛽𝑡 to allow 
us to use equation (1) to assess investment risk-sharing, we bear in mind the 
aforementioned principles of risk-sharing, which basically imply that the higher the level 
of risk-sharing, the lower the dependence upon idiosyncratic shocks. Similarly to the 
analysis in IMF (2015) to assess the impact of output on private investment growth, we 
check the impact of the level of openness on investment growth through an adaptation 
of the traditional accelerator investment model: 
∆ ln 𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽𝑖 +  𝛽𝑡∆ ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿𝑡𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∗ ∆ ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾∆ ln 𝑅𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡              (3) 
In the above equation where i denotes the ith country and t denotes the tth year, ∆ ln 𝐼𝑖𝑡 
is the change in (log) real per capita domestic investment, and ∆ ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡 the change in (log) 
real per capita domestic output; 𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛 is the chosen index of capital controls, which varies 
from 0 (in the absence of capital controls) to 1 (when the capital account is fully closed); 
∆ ln 𝑅𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 is the change in (log) price of investment goods relative to consumption. As in 
the consumption equation, the residual term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 captures non-systematic influences on 
consumption risk sharing, some of which could in principle be correlated across time.  
Preliminary considerations are made for each model, namely by performing the 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation (which finds no first order autocorrelation), and two 
unit root tests (which reject the presence of a unit root in every panel), while the errors 
in the model are also clustered on country in order to take into consideration unobserved 
correlation and heteroskedasticity. The results for these preliminary tests can be found 
in Appendix B. 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Baseline Model 
4.1.1. Consumption risk-sharing 
 
Table 4.1 – Consumption risk-sharing results for selected estimations 
 
Note: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. A complete description of the variables can be found in Appendix A. 
The dependent variable is ∆log(C)-∆log(C*). A linear time trend was added to the regression but not reported. 
The level of IRS for fully open economies is given by performing 1–𝛽𝑡 (the coefficient of ∆log(Y)-
∆log(Y*)).The reported 𝑅2 for Fixed Effects refers to the Within estimator.  
  
 Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Country and 
Time Effects 
 CI SCH CI SCH CI SCH 
Full Sample       
∆log(Y)-∆log(Y*) .6011*** .6328*** .5534*** .5988*** .5630*** .6030*** 
 (.0663) (.0768) (.0664) (.0802) (.0674) (.0806) 
Kcon .0072*** .0058** -.0001 -.0055 .0041 -.0025 
 (.0020) (.0022) (.0038) (.0068) (.0041) (.0069) 
Kcon*(∆log(Y)-∆log(Y*)) .2590** .1923 .3204** .2181 .2949** .2050 
 (.1181) (.1515) (.1407) (.1862) (.1400) (.1861) 
𝑅2 0.2796 0.2738 0.2181 0.2128 0.2336 0.2297 
Advanced Economies       
∆log(Y)-∆log(Y*) .5774*** .5697*** .5690*** .5661*** .5808*** .5822*** 
 (.0982) (.1073) (.0980) (.1057) (.1207) (.1263) 
Kcon .0023 .0050 .0025 .0062 .0033 .0065 
 (.0048) (.0049) (.0074) (.0063) (.0080) (.0064) 
Kcon*(∆log(Y)-∆log(Y*)) .5024*** .3839* .5338*** .3921* .5349*** .3921* 
 (.1775) (.1953) (.1882) (.1989) (.1793) (.1945) 
𝑅2 0.5762 0.5683 0.5532 0.5434 0.5800 0.5703 
Emerging Markets & 
Developing Economies 
      
∆log(Y)-∆log(Y*) .6010*** .6424*** .5340*** .6008*** .5205*** .5736*** 
 (.0862) (.0981) (.0841) (.1035) (.0856) (.1013) 
Kcon .0061** .0037 -.0026 -.0133 .0031 -.0090 
 (.0028) (.0030) (.0033) (.0094) (.0038) (.0094) 
Kcon*(∆log(Y)-∆log(Y*)) .2484* .1729 .3301** .202296 .3186** .2206 
 (.1391) (.1775) (.1603) (.2152) (.1580) (.2132) 
𝑅2 0.2523 0.2474 0.1944 0.1899 0.2183 0.2155 
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For the baseline model of consumption risk-sharing, following the methodology 
employed in Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2009) to assess the level of international risk-
sharing (IRS), overall IRS values are found within the larger end of the intervals 
estimated in the literature. Throughout all estimation methods and development stages, 
for an economy with full capital account openness, the estimated level of IRS ranges 
between 0.48 and 0.36. Fixed Effects (FE) estimations generally suggest higher levels 
of IRS than the Pooled OLS (POLS) and Fixed Country and Time Effects (FCTE) ones 
– the exception being the Developing Economies group, for which FCTE estimates 
higher IRS levels than FE. The Chinn & Ito index outperforms the Schindler index when 
it comes to significance across estimation procedures. The estimations performed with 
the Schindler index provide no significant evidence in support of a negative impact of 
capital controls on IRS on three grounds: the results for the full sample under FE and 
FCTE (the results for the full sample under POLS suggest a negative impact from the 
capital controls variable, although the results for the interaction variable are not 
significant) and for developing economies under all estimation methods. The capital 
controls variable alone is generally insignificant, especially under FE and FCTE. 
Focusing on the Chinn & Ito index and the FCTE estimator, for the entire sample of 100 
countries, we find an IRS level varying between 0.44 for the completely open economies 
and just over 0.14, under that same estimation method, for those economies which have 
completely closed capital accounts. Among advanced economies, these values for IRS 
range from around 0.42 for the most open under FCTE, to virtually no IRS for the least 
open economies within this group (we must still bear in mind the fact that for the group 
of high income economies there are no countries classified as Wall). For the group of 
developing economies, under FCTE, the values of IRS vary between almost 0.48, for 
those which are completely open, and less than 0.16 for those with a completely closed 
capital account. 
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With regard to the Schindler index, taking only the significant results on the full sample 
level, the highest estimated IRS level is of 0.4 (under both FE and FCTE). For advanced 
economies alone, an IRS level of 0.42 is found for the most open economies, under 
FCTE, and of 0.05 for those which enforce the most capital controls. Finally, among fully 
open developing economies, the average risk-sharing coefficient across specifications 
is 0.43, under FCTE. 
 
Figure 2: Relationship between ∆log(Y)-∆log(Y*) and ∆log(C)-∆log(C*) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For both indices, the level of IRS is very close between open economies, regardless of 
their income group. Although it is traditionally suggested that there could be institutional 
quality impediments for developing countries to experience the same IRS as advanced 
economies, these results suggest no significant impediments to IRS brought about by 
the development stage a country finds itself in. 
These results compare to Kose, Prasad and Torrones (2009) and Gardberg (2019) as 
they fit the IRS intervals previously found by in the aforementioned literature, while a 
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significant impact of capital controls on consumption risk-sharing is also suggested, 
especially when the Chinn & Ito index is used. This is a clearer result than the one 
reached by Kose, Prasad and Torrones (2009), which are unable to find a significant 
impact of capital account openness across all income levels given any of the measures 
which were applied. 
Although the apparent differences in explained variation are not large across estimation 
methods, the adequateness of the FCTE estimator is assessed by performing a test of 
joint significance for all years and individual countries, which indicates the inclusion of 
Time Effects is desired to estimate this regression. 
 
 
4.1.2. Investment risk-sharing 
 
Taking into account the absence of an equally intuitive measure for IRS, when it comes 
to assessing the impact of capital account openness on investment risk-sharing, we must 
analyze the results in a comparative manner. As noted in the previous section, we should 
expect countries with higher levels of capital mobility to depend less upon idiosyncratic 
shocks – investment should, on average, move in tandem with the world interest rate 
and the price of capital relative to that of consumption. In this case, we would expect that 
the higher the level of capital account openness, the smaller the coefficient of the capital 
controls interaction variable (thus depicting that when controls are in place, domestic 
output growth is more impactful on investment growth). We would also expect investment 
to grow faster in countries with less capital controls, all else remaining constant. 
Through the entire scope of results, the coefficients of both the output growth variable 
and the interaction variable are of the expected positive sign, with the former falling into 
the usual values for the coefficient of output growth in investment-accelerator models 
(IMF, 2015), and the latter being mostly according to predictions. As was also expected, 
higher capital controls tend to reduce investment growth. 
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Regardless of the scope of the estimation, FE estimations always suggest greater 
dependence of domestic investment from domestic output than the Pooled OLS and 
FCTE ones, whether it be through the output variables or through the interaction 
variables. Neither one of the two indices employed produces substantially more 
significant results than the other. The estimations systematically show support for the 
existence of a negative impact of capital controls on investment IRS through the 
interaction variable. The capital controls variable alone is always significant (and 
negative) under Pooled OLS and insignificant under FE and FCTE for the full sample 
and the group of developing economies, given any of the two measures of capital 
controls. 
Using the Chinn & Ito index and under FCTE, for the entire sample of 100 countries, for 
a 1 percent change in domestic output, there is a percentage change in domestic 
investment of between 1.68%, for those economies which are completely open, and of 
3.64% for those which have completely closed capital accounts. Among advanced 
economies, these values range from around 2.3% for the most open, to around 4.3% for 
the least open economies within this group, under FCTE (still keeping in mind there are 
no countries within this group which have a completely closed capital account). For the 
group of developing economies, the same values vary between just over 1.29%, for 
those which are completely open, and around 3.66% for those with a completely closed 
capital account, under FCTE. 
With regard to the Schindler index, the estimated coefficient for domestic output for 
completely open economies obtained under FCTE suggests that a 1% change in 
domestic output produces a 1.85% change in domestic investment, and of 3.69% for 
economies with completely closed capital accounts. For the group of advanced 
economies, the same change is found to be between 2.15%, for completely open 
economies, and of 4.41% for those which enforce the most capital controls (both under 
FCTE). Finally, among developing economies, we find a 1% change in domestic output 
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generates a 1.66% change in domestic investment for completely open economies and 
of 3.66% for completely closed economies under FCTE. 
For both indices, results show a slightly smaller impact of domestic output growth on 
domestic investment for developing economies than for advanced economies. This 
contradicts initial suspicions that advanced economies should be less dependent upon 
their own domestic output gains for investment growth. Even considering differences are 
not large, we may, at best, consider there are seemingly no differences in the impact of 
domestic output performance on domestic investment across development stages.  
Considering there is no direct comparison available in the literature – at least not of the 
sort that exists for consumption risk-sharing – we opt to highlight that the results reassert 
those in IMF (2015), given the finding of a negative impact of capital controls on domestic 
investment growth, and may indicate a correspondence to the contribution of Caselli and 
Fryer (2007), given the small differences found for the impact of domestic output growth 
on domestic investment growth, between economies with similar levels of capital account 
openness.  
Once again, the adequateness of the FCTE estimator is assessed by performing a test 
of joint significance for all years and individual countries, which indicates the inclusion of 
Time Effects is desired to estimate this regression. 
  
  
22 
 
Table 4.2 – Investment risk-sharing for FE and POLS 
 
Note: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. A description of each variable can be found in Appendix A. The 
dependent variable is ∆log(I). A linear time trend was added to the regression but not reported. The reported 
𝑅2 for Fixed Effects refers to the Within estimator. 
 Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Country and Time 
Effects 
 CI SCH CI SCH CI SCH 
Full Sample       
∆log(Y) 2.0500*** 2.1030*** 2.1263*** 2.2138*** 1.6771*** 1.8491*** 
 (.2669) (.3003) (.3252) (.3506) (.3347) (.3559) 
Kcon -.0448*** -.0485** -.0324 -.0126 -.0271 -.0025 
 (.0145) (.0188) (.0263) (.0354) (.0246) (.0314) 
Kcon*∆log(Y) 1.3492*** 1.3197** 1.6487*** 1.6606** 1.9633*** 1.8429*** 
 (.4922) (.6219) (.5970) (.7142) (.5800) (.6933) 
∆log(rpi) -.1132 -.1208 -.1215 -.1307 -.1490 -.1581 
 (.0867) (.0937) (.0907) (.0977) (.1028) (.1121) 
𝑅2 0.1820 0.1782 0.1739 0.1726 0.2013 0.1967 
Advanced Economies       
∆log(Y) 2.3869*** 2.2229*** 2.4778*** 2.3067*** 2.3073*** 2.1497*** 
 (.1798) (.1967) (.1976) (.2175) (.2634) (.2790) 
Kcon -.0796*** -.0799*** -.0727*** -.0798*** -.0871*** -.0909*** 
 (.0120) (.0148) (.0213) (.0211) (.0184) (.0200) 
Kcon*∆log(Y) 1.6500** 2.0177*** 1.8239** 2.2320*** 2.0686*** 2.4061*** 
 (.7479) (.6860) (.7803) (.6515) (.7180) (.6367) 
∆log(rpi) .0772** .0880** .0747** .0860** .0818 .1104* 
 (.0310) (.0328) (.0317) (.0347) (.0523) (.0587) 
𝑅2 0.5743 0.5742 0.5774 0.5797 0.6008 0.6015 
Emerging Markets & 
Developing Economies 
      
∆log(Y) 1.7395*** 1.9203*** 1.7833*** 2.0657*** 1.2920*** 1.6635*** 
 (.3782) (.4476) (.4995) (.5427) (.4722) (.5202) 
Kcon -.0581*** -.0612** -.0252 .0242 -.0108 .0441 
 (.0183) (.0258) (.0337) (.04778) (.0304) (.0407) 
Kcon*∆log(Y) 1.7368*** 1.5533* 2.1006*** 1.8631* 2.3720*** 1.9991** 
 (.6163) (.7980) (.7928) (.9438) (.7275) (.8773) 
∆log(rpi) -.1316 -.1381 -.1402 -.1511 -.1735 -.1843 
 (.1028) (.1113) (.1081) (.1160) (.1203) (.1305) 
𝑅2 0.1566 0.1527 0.1497 0.1489 0.1852 0.1806 
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4.2. Robustness Tests 
 
4.2.1. Comparison of capital controls measures 
 
There is a notorious discrepancy between the two measures of capital controls 
employed, both on the values they attribute to individual countries and on the values 
which result from estimations. In order to verify the possibility that outliers are interfering 
with the overall results, we remove countries for which the difference between the two 
measures of controls is too high – we arbitrarily set as “too high” a difference of 0.4 or 
more. As a result, 15 countries are removed from the initial sample of 100 countries, for 
which we provide a brief description which can be found in Appendix B. The three 
previously employed estimation methods are narrowed down to only two by removing 
FE, given the similarity of results between FE and FTCE, together with the fact that the 
test shown in Appendix B suggests the incorporation of time effects in our estimations. 
The results for the consumption risk-sharing estimations with the modified indices are 
presented in Table B.6 in Appendix B. Coefficient values for both estimators become 
more close for all variables, but no substantial change in IRS levels arises. The 
noteworthy changes are: for both measures, no variable related to the capital account 
openness measure (whether on its own or through the interaction variable) is found 
significant, under FCTE; from the regression with the Schindler index, a higher risk-
sharing level for the most open developing economies is suggested (0.47, under FCTE). 
A similar case can be found for investment risk-sharing, for which, regarding the 
estimations based on the Chinn & Ito index, no significant changes occur comparing to 
previous results. With the Schindler index, once again, the biggest difference is within 
the group of developing economies, for which a 1% percent change in domestic output 
now leads to a 1.26% change in domestic investment for the most open countries of the 
group and a 3.87% change for the completely closed economies (under FE). These 
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results can be found in Table B.8 in Appendix B, with the updated results for estimations 
excluding the aforementioned outliers. 
 
4.2.2. Sensitivity to country groupings 
 
In order to assess how sensitive our results are to the currently employed classification 
of countries as either Advanced Economies or Emerging Markets & Developing 
Economies, we estimate the results for these groups of countries for the current 2016 
classification (which can be found in Table 3.1 in section 3) and for the 1995 IMF World 
Economic Outlook classification shown in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 – 1995 World Economic Outlook classification of countries 
 
Advanced Economies (26) Countries in Transition (14) Developing Economies (60) 
Australia  Bulgaria  Algeria Malta 
Austria  Czech Republic  Angola Mauritius 
Belgium  Georgia  Argentina Mexico 
Canada  Hungary  Bahrain Morocco 
Denmark  Kazakhstan  Bangladesh Myanmar 
Finland  Kirgizstan   Bolivia Nicaragua 
France  Latvia  Brazil Nigeria 
Germany  Moldova  Brunei Oman 
Greece  Poland  Burkina Faso Pakistan 
Hong Kong  Romania  Chile Panama 
Iceland  Russia  China Paraguay 
Ireland  Slovenia  Colombia Peru 
Israel  Ukraine  Costa Rica Philippines 
Italy  Uzbekistan  Côte D’Ivoire Qatar 
Japan    Cyprus Saudi Arabia 
Korea    Dominican Republic South Africa 
Netherlands    Ecuador Sri Lanka 
New Zealand    Egypt Swaziland 
Norway    El Salvador Tanzania 
Portugal    Ethiopia Thailand 
Singapore    Ghana Togo 
Spain    Guatemala Tunisia 
Sweden    India Turkey 
Switzerland    Iran Uganda 
United Kingdom    Indonesia United Arab Emirates 
United States    Jamaica Uruguay 
    Kenya Venezuela 
    Kuwait Vietnam 
    Lebanon Yemen 
    Malaysia Zambia 
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The first notes should regard the drastic difference in the country classification system 
used by the IMF: even though between 1995 and 2016 only a handful of countries have 
been promoted to “advanced economy” status, there is a serious methodological 
difference between those years when it comes to separating emerging markets and 
developing countries. Indeed, in 1995 the IMF suggested a three-way split of the world, 
forming the groups Advanced Economies, Developing Economies and Economies in 
Transition. The latter included all the economies which were in transition from state-
controlled economies to market economies following the decline of the USSR in 1991. 
That group is added to the group of Emerging Markets & Developing Economies, for 
comparison purposes, when the 1995 country classification is used. From April 2004 
onwards, that classification system was substituted by a two-way split into the groups of 
Advanced Economies and Emerging Markets & Developing Economies, with no defined 
criterion available to differentiate between an emerging market and a developing 
economy. That is why only the economies marked in the IMF October 2016 WEO as 
Low-Income Developing Countries are considered to be developing economies. Any 
country not classified as either Advanced or Developing is classified as an Emerging 
Market in the 2016 system. Taking all of this into account, we should keep in mind the 
fragility of such classification systems, and thus opt to stick to the broad grouping method 
employed in previous sections. Just as in the previous robustness check, the three 
previously employed estimation methods are narrowed down to only two (we remove 
FE) given the similarity of results between FE and FTCE and the fact that the test shown 
in Appendix B suggests the incorporation of time effects. 
Starting with the consumption risk-sharing comparison, the magnitude in which the 
results vary depending on the classification – even though in terms of individual variable 
significance the results do not show much of a difference – is noticeable. Among 
developed economies the coefficients vary substantially, suggesting, for example, a level 
of IRS of 50% for the most open economies following the 1995 classification (under 
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POLS and FCTE, with the Schindler index), while the suggested level of IRS following 
the 2016 classification is of little more than 0.43. For the group of emerging markets and 
developing economies, the largest level of IRS suggested following the 1995 
classification is of over 0.45 (FCTE, Chinn-Ito index) while with the 2016 classification, 
that same value can be up to over 0.48, both considering countries with fully open capital 
accounts.  
 Table 4.4 – Consumption risk-sharing comparison 
Note: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. A description of each variable can be found in Appendix A. The 
dependent variable is ∆log(C)- ∆log(C*). A linear time trend was added to the regression but not reported. 
The level of IRS for fully open economies is given by performing 1–𝛽𝑡 (the coefficient of ∆log(Y)-∆log(Y*)). 
The reported 𝑅2 for Fixed Effects refers to the Within estimator.  
 1995 2016 
 Pooled OLS Fixed Country and 
Time Effects 
Pooled OLS Fixed Country and 
Time Effects 
 CI SCH CI SCH CI SCH CI SCH 
Full Sample         
∆log(Y)-∆log(Y*) .6011*** .6328*** .5630*** .6030*** .6011*** .6328*** .5630*** .6030*** 
 (.0663) (.0768) (.0674) (.0806) (.0663) (.0768) (.0674) (.0806) 
Kcon .0072*** .0058*** .0041 -.0025 .0072*** .0058** .0041 -.0025 
 (.0020) (.0022) (.0041) (.0069) (.0020) (.0022) (.0041) (.0069) 
Kcon*(∆log(Y)-∆log(Y*)) .2590** .1923 .2949** .2050 .2590** .1923 .2949** .2050 
 (.1181) (.1515) (.1400) (.1861) (.1181) (.1515) (.1400) (.1861) 
𝑅2 0.2796 0.2738 0.2336 0.2297 0.2796 0.2738 0.2336 0.2297 
Advanced Economies         
∆log(Y)-∆log(Y*) .5191*** .5033*** .5067*** .5043*** .5774*** .5697*** .5808*** .5822*** 
 (.0916) (.0992) (.1114) (.1165) (.0982) (.1073) (.1207) (.1263) 
Kcon -.0039 -.0010 -.0136** -.0037 .0023 .0050 .0033 .0065 
 (.0030) (.0044) (.0061) (.0051) (.0048) (.0049) (.0080) (.0064) 
Kcon*(∆log(Y)-∆log(Y*)) .6120*** .5330** .6492*** .5573** .5024*** .3839* .5349*** .3921* 
 (.1948) (.2289) (.1896) (.2202) (.1775) (.1953) (.1793) (.1945) 
𝑅2 0.5540 0.5396 0.5799 0.5592 0.5762 0.5683 0.5800 0.5703 
Emerging Markets & 
Developing Economies 
        
∆log(Y)-∆log(Y*) .6164*** .6530*** .5462*** .5933*** .6010*** .6424*** .5205*** .5736*** 
 (.0813) (.0925) (.0834) (.0980) (.0862) (.0981) (.0856) (.1013) 
Kcon .0066** .0045 .0083* -.0002 .0061** .0037 .0031 -.0090 
 (.0026) (.0028) (.0045) (.0087) (.0028) (.0030) (.0038) (.0094) 
Kcon*(∆log(Y)-∆log(Y*)) .2294* .1569 .2942* .2006 .2484* .1729 .3186** .2206 
 (.1349) (.1714) (.1568) (.2086) (.1391) (.1775) (.1580) (.2132) 
𝑅2 0.2610 0.2562 0.2264 0.2229 0.2523 0.2474 0.2183 0.2155 
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With regard to the investment risk-sharing comparison, the case is rather the same, 
although with an overall smaller magnitude. Among advanced economies the values of 
the coefficients, e.g. for the output variable, differ significantly as well – from a minimum 
of 1.84 following the 1995 classification, to a minimum value of 2.15 following the 2016 
country classification (both values obtained under FCTE, using the Schindler index). 
Similar to the case of consumption risk-sharing, within the group of emerging markets 
coefficients diverge as well, with the result obtained under FCTE, using the Chinn-Ito 
index shows a coefficient with the value of 1.56 following the 1995 classification, and 
1.29 using the 2016 classification system. 
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Table 4.5 – Investment risk-sharing comparison 
 
Note: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. A description of each variable can be found in Appendix A. The 
dependent variable is ∆log(I). A linear time trend was added to the regression but not reported. The reported 
𝑅2 for Fixed Effects refers to the Within estimator. 
  
 1995 2016 
 Pooled OLS Fixed Country and Time 
Effects 
Pooled OLS Fixed Country and Time 
Effects 
 CI SCH CI SCH CI SCH CI SCH 
Full Sample         
∆log(Y) 2.0500*** 2.1030*** 1.6771*** 1.8491*** 2.0500*** 2.1030*** 1.6771*** 1.8491*** 
 (.2669) (.3003) (.3347) (.3559) (.2669) (.3003) (.3347) (.3559) 
Kcon -.0448*** -.0485** -.0271 -.0025 -.0448*** -.0485** -.0271 -.0025 
 (.0145) (.0188) (.0246) (.0314) (.0145) (.0188) (.0246) (.0314) 
Kcon*∆log(Y) 1.3492*** 1.3197** 1.9633*** 1.8429*** 1.3492*** 1.3197** 1.9633*** 1.8429*** 
 (.4922) (.6219) (.5800) (.6933) (.4922) (.6219) (.5800) (.6933) 
∆log(rpi) -.1132 -.1208 -.1490 -.1581 -.1132 -.1208 -.1490 -.1581 
 (.0867) (.0937) (.1028) (.1121) (.0867) (.0937) (.1028) (.1121) 
𝑅2 0.1820 0.1782 0.2013 0.1967 0.1820 0.1782 0.2013 0.1967 
Advanced Economies         
∆log(Y) 2.1720*** 1.9900*** 2.0079*** 1.8357*** 2.3869*** 2.2229*** 2.3073*** 2.1497*** 
 (.1827) (.1847) (.2179) (.2133) (.1798) (.1967) (.2634) (.2790) 
Kcon -.0755*** -.0624*** -.0768** -.0679** -.0796*** -.0799*** -.0871*** -.0909*** 
 (.0196) (.0221) (.0290) (.0263) (.0120) (.0148) (.0184) (.0200) 
Kcon*∆log(Y) 2.0155* 2.5151** 2.5452** 3.0496*** 1.6500** 2.0177*** 2.0686*** 2.4061*** 
 (.9952) (.9744) (.9255) (.7637) (.7479) (.6860) (.7180) (.6367) 
∆log(rpi) .0870** .1020** .0995* .1378** .0772** .0880** .0818 .1104* 
 (.0373) (.0402) (.0561) (.0668) (.0310) (.0328) (.0523) (.0587) 
𝑅2 0.5928 0.5924 0.6399 0.6407 0.5743 0.5742 0.6008 0.6015 
Emerging Markets & 
Developing Economies 
        
∆log(Y) 1.9764*** 2.0788*** 1.5594*** 1.8282***  1.7395*** 1.9203*** 1.2920*** 1.6635*** 
 (.3687) (.4135) (.4595) (.4792) (.3782) (.4476) (.4722) (.5202) 
Kcon -.0514*** -.0559** -.0155 .0200 -.0581*** -.0612** -.0108 .0441 
 (.0181) (.0247) (.0272) (.0362) (.0183) (.0258) (.0304) (.0407) 
Kcon*∆log(Y) 1.4329** 1.3451* 2.0246*** 1.7623** 1.7368*** 1.5533* 2.3720*** 1.9991** 
 (.5992) (.7546) (.7098) (.8287) (.6163) (.7980) (.7275) (.8773) 
∆log(rpi) -.12867 -.1366 -.1687 -.1801 -.1316 -.1381 -.1735 -.1843 
 (.0998) (.1080) (.1171) (.1274) (.1028) (.1113) (.1203) (.1305) 
𝑅2 0.1653 0.1622 0.1910 0.1870 0.1566 0.1527 0.1852 0.1806 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The recent memory of the Great Recession of 2008-09 and of the European financial 
crises in the years that followed the Great Recession have prompted a re-examination 
of the role of capital controls as an instrument of macro-financial policy management. 
This thesis aimed at evaluating the impact of capital account openness (or the other side 
of the same coin, capital controls) on one of the most important potential benefits of 
capital mobility as referred in the literature – international risk-sharing. The possibility for 
agents to insure themselves against country-specific shocks through consumption and 
investment channels should provide an important balance in situations of crisis, allowing 
them to not suffer from sudden restrictions on their levels of consumption or desired 
investment. However, when macro or financial shocks are of global nature, there is an 
understandable temptation by national policy makers to use capital controls as an 
instrument to achieve some insulation of their economies – even if only temporary -- from 
the stormier waters of international capital markets in those circumstances. The question 
is then whether on balance (i.e. including “good” and “bad” times), there is a benefit that 
is economically and statistically significant. 
In this work, a sample of 100 countries across different economic development stages 
was analyzed between 1995 and 2016, thereby including global crises periods (as in 
2008-09) as well as periods of low global macroeconomic and financial volatility like 
1999-2006. Previous literature found relatively low levels of international risk-sharing for 
consumption in particular and mixed evidence on the impact of capital account 
openness. Especially for developing countries, de jure measures of capital controls were 
not successful in explaining differences in international risk-sharing caused by the 
existence of controls on international capital mobility. In contrast, economically and 
statistically significant results were found in support of a positive impact of openness on 
international risk-sharing suggested: completely open economies share almost 40% of 
their consumption risk internationally (over three times the amount shared by closed 
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economies), and enjoy an at least 1.5 p.p. smaller dependence of domestic output 
growth on their investment growth than that faced by closed countries within the same 
income group. 
As also shown in this thesis, these results are not uniform across capital control 
measures, specifications and country groupings. For consumption risk-sharing in 
advanced countries, the benefits of capital account openness are more homogenously 
estimated across capital control measures and country grouping (i.e. whether for 
instance one uses a 1995-based vs. a 2016-based definition of advanced economies). 
This is an important result particularly in light of the better quality of the data in those 
countries which should make inference more reliable. As for investment risk-sharing, 
there is evidence of a significant effect that is less dependent on the capital control 
measure and country grouping. Importantly, I also find evidence that higher capital 
account openness is associated with higher investment growth on average, 
These results suggest that, when looking at the benefits of economy-wide capital controls 
to help reduce macroeconomic and financial vulnerability to sudden stops in capital 
flows, policy makers should be no less equally mindful of the benefits of capital account 
openness to promote smoother consumption and investment growth, as well as faster 
investment and economic growth on average.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A 
Data description 
 
Table A.1. Data description 
 
  
Variable Description Unit 
Y Per capita real domestic gross domestic product at 
constant 2011 national prices 
Mil. 2011 US$ 
Y* Per capita real world gross domestic product at 
constant 2011 national prices 
Mil. 2011 US$ 
C Per capita real domestic consumption at constant 
2011 national prices 
Mil. 2011 US$ 
C* Per capita real world consumption at constant 2011 
national prices 
Mil. 2011 US$ 
I Per capita real domestic investment at constant 
2011 national prices 
Mil. 2011 US$ 
rpi 
Relative price of investment 
Ratio between investment 
deflator and consumption 
deflator 
∆log(Y) 
First-differenced logarithm of y – 
∆log(Y*) 
First-differenced logarithm of Y – 
∆log(C) 
First-differenced logarithm of c – 
∆log(C*) 
First-differenced logarithm of C – 
∆log(I) 
First-differenced logarithm of inv – 
Kcon Capital account controls variable; either Chinn & Ito 
or Schindler measure 
Index where 0 indicates 
open capital account and 1 
closed capital account 
∆log(rpi) 
First-differenced logarithm of rpi – 
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Appendix B 
Test and regression outputs 
 
B.1 Preliminary tests 
Table B.1.1. Unit Root Tests on consumption dependent variable: Levin-Lin-Chu 
Adjusted t Panels Periods 
-9.3798*** 100 21 
t statistics in parentheses 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1 
Table B.1.2 Unit Root Tests on consumption dependent variable: Im-Pesaran-Shin 
Z-t-tilde-bar Panels Periods 
-14.8076*** 100 21 
t statistics in parentheses 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1 
Both tests strongly reject the hypothesis that all panels contain unit roots. 
 
Table B.2 Unit Root Tests on investment dependent variable: Im-Pesaran-Shin 
Z-t-tilde-bar Panels Periods 
-20.2305*** 100 21 
t statistics in parentheses 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1 
The test strongly rejects the hypothesis that all panels contain unit roots. 
Note: the LLC unit root test requires strongly balanced panels, thus, it’s not available for the 
investment dependent variable. 
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Table B.3.1: Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data (consumption) 
F Prob > F 
2.301 0.1325 
 
Table B.3.2: Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data (investment) 
F Prob > F 
0.509 0.4773 
 
The null hypothesis that there is no first order autocorrelation is not rejected. 
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B.2 Regression Outputs and Robustness Tests 
 
 
Table B.4.1 Test for joint-significance of time effects (consumption) 
F Prob > F 
3.22 0.0001 
 
 
 
Table B.4.2 Test for joint-significance of time effects (investment) 
F Prob > F 
3.27 0.0001 
 
 
The null hypothesis that the coefficients for all years is equal to zero is rejected. 
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Table B.5 Outliers between Chinn & Ito and Schindler indices 
 
 
  
Countries removed from sample No. of periods with excessive discrepancy 
Bulgaria 7 periods 
Czech Republic 5 periods 
Dominican Republic 8 periods 
Egypt 5 periods 
Georgia 4 periods 
Ghana 10 periods 
Jamaica 8 periods 
Kazakhstan 7 periods 
Korea 4 periods 
Lebanon 10 periods 
Nigeria 20 periods 
Paraguay 4 periods 
Saudi Arabia 7 periods 
Turkey 12 periods 
Venezuela 6 periods 
  
39 
 
Table B.6 – Consumption risk-sharing (removing outliers) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. A description of each variable can be found in Appendix A. The 
dependent variable is ∆log(C) - ∆log(C*). A linear time trend was added to the regression but not reported. 
The level of IRS for fully open economies is given by performing 1–𝛽𝑡 (the coefficient of ∆log(Y)-∆log(Y*)). 
The reported 𝑅2 for Fixed Effects refers to the Within estimator. 
  
 Pooled OLS Fixed Country and Time 
Effects 
 CI SCH CI SCH 
Full Sample     
∆log(Y)-∆log(Y*) .5930*** .5890*** .5596*** .5742*** 
 (.0709) (.0792) (.0724) (.0850) 
Kcon .0084*** .0079*** .0028 .0031 
 (.0021) (.0022) (.0057) (.0063) 
Kcon*(∆log(Y)-∆log(Y*)) .2019 .1917 .2296 .1749 
 (.1310) (.1597) (.1642) (.2018) 
𝑅2 0.2846 0.2805 0.2343 0.2314 
Advanced Economies     
∆log(Y)-∆log(Y*) .5822*** .5689*** .5836*** .5755*** 
 (.1016) (.1101) (.1241) (.1302) 
Kcon .0046 .0070 .0053 .0099 
 (.0054) (.0052) (.0088) (.0065) 
Kcon*(∆log(Y)-∆log(Y*)) .3939** .3172* .4239** .3204* 
 (.1748) (.1728) (.1702) (.1633) 
𝑅2 0.5624 0.5614 0.5660 0.5647 
Emerging Markets & 
Developing Economies 
    
∆log(Y)-∆log(Y*) .5875*** .5855*** .5149*** .5330*** 
 (.0937) (.1042) (.0942) (.1096) 
Kcon .0078** .0066** .0004 -.0012 
 (.0031) (.0029) (.0051) (.0079) 
Kcon*(∆log(Y)-∆log(Y*)) .1974 .1868 .2628 .2101 
 (.1520) (.1884) (.1841) (.2333) 
𝑅2 0.2505 0.2471 0.2157 0.2133 
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Table B.7 – Investment risk-sharing (removing outliers) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. A description of each variable can be found in Appendix A. The 
dependent variable is ∆log(I). A linear time trend was added to the regression but not reported. The reported 
𝑅2 for Fixed Effects refers to the Within estimator. 
 
 Pooled OLS Fixed Country and Time 
Effects 
 CI SCH CI SCH 
Full Sample     
∆log(Y) 2.0978*** 2.0258*** 1.7354*** 1.7126*** 
 (.2957) (.3164) (.3809) (.3819) 
Kcon -.0477*** -.0637*** -.0351 -.0289 
 (.0177) (.0199) (.0294) (.0314) 
Kcon*∆log(Y) 1.3678** 1.5781** 1.9112** 2.0848*** 
 (.6002) (.6628) (.7409) (.7629) 
∆log(rpi) -.1607 -.2013* -.2692** -.3180** 
 (.1118) (.1130) (.1347) (.1362) 
𝑅2 0.1779 0.1777 0.2015 0.2028 
Advanced Economies     
∆log(Y) 2.3733*** 2.1988*** 2.3024*** 2.1302*** 
 (.1850) (.2016) (.2673) (.2806) 
Kcon -.0796*** -.0757*** -.0955*** -.0856*** 
 (.0149) (.0172) (.0181) (.0231) 
Kcon*∆log(Y) 2.4008*** 2.4755*** 2.5544*** 2.6663*** 
 (.7663) (.7169) (.6954) (.7087) 
∆log(rpi) .0903** .0962579** .0944 .1186 
 (.0346) (.0378) (.0611) (.0709) 
𝑅2 0.5647 0.5655 0.5868 0.5871 
Emerging Markets & 
Developing Economies 
    
∆log(Y) 1.7806*** 1.7012*** 1.2815** 1.2628** 
 (.4490) (.5122) (.5580) (.5842) 
Kcon -.0638*** -.0879*** -.0156 .0073 
 (.0218) (.0283) (.0375) (.0442) 
Kcon*∆log(Y) 1.7920** 2.0711** 2.3848** 2.6082** 
 (.7538) (.8880) (.9347) (1.0201) 
∆log(rpi) -.2282 -.2772* -.3659 -.4267** 
 (.1409) (.1400) (.1631) (.1633) 
𝑅2 0.1503 0.1529 0.1885 0.1930 
